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CHAPTER 11: A DEATH PENALTY FOR
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR INTERESTS
Hon. Edith H. Jonest
The last time I spoke before The Federalist Society, the subject
was the death penalty. Today I am going to speak on the subject of
another death penalty, Chapter 11. For as far as I am concerned,
there is very little good to be accomplished, either from a social
standpoint or in the particular case as it appears before our courts,
under the rubric of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Neither I nor Professor Warren will be dealing with the ques-
tion of individual bankruptcies because we did not think they fit with
a discussion of the thrift and banking industries. That issue would
better tie into today's subject of individual responsibilities and the
socialization of risk. So we will address Chapter 11, the reorganiza-
tion provision, which is more frequently utilized by corporations,
partnerships, limited partnerships, and business entities than by in-
dividuals. Whereas the thrust of much of the Bankruptcy Code, and
indeed its historical existence, was based on the idea of discharging
the honest but unfortunate debtor, discharge and relieving the per-
son of debts to make a fresh start in life simply does not come into
play in most Chapter 11 cases for several reasons. The first and, for
present purposes, conclusive one is that in Chapter 11, a debtor
does not get a discharge until it confirms a plan of reorganization.
What we are talking about is, as The Wall Street Journal defines a
Chapter 11 proceeding, a breathing-space during which a company
can avoid paying its creditors while it negotiates to restructure its
debt.' The idea of Chapter 11 reorganization is that a company fac-
ing a large amount of debt, whether or not it is balance-sheet insol-
vent, can take advantage of the automatic stay. Creditors cannot
collect on the debts, and the company can attempt to renegotiate its
debt and continue business at the same time.
t The author serves on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Houston,
Texas. She received her B.A. from Cornell University and herJ.D. from the University
of Texas. As a partner at Andrews & Kurth until 1985, her areas of concentration in-
cluded bankruptcy, litigation, and Federal Election Commission law. She was on the
Board of Directors of Texas Law Review Publications, Inc. from 1978 to 1983 and is a
member of several associations and foundations, including the American Bar Associa-
tion Business Bankruptcy Committee.
I Eugene Carlson, Enterprise: Finding a Quick Route Through Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 1991, at B-1.
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But what is really happening in Chapter 11? Is it fulfilling the
goal of allowing businesses to reorganize? The reason I spoke of it
as a death penalty is that, for all practical purposes, Chapter 11 is
not facilitating reorganizations. The amended Bankruptcy Code,
enacted in 1978, enabled companies to seek Chapter 11 relief much
more easily. But only 10% of the bankruptcies that are filed in
Chapter 11 end in confirmed plans of reorganization! 2 That means
that 90% of them are spending about two or three years each under
the aegis of the bankruptcy court, shepherded along and, needless
to say, paying the fees of lots of attorneys and professional people,
for what end? Nothing. Because most of them end up liquidating.
Even among those that file and confirm reorganization plans, many
of them, in my experience, call for an orderly liquidation. So
although you can speculate to your heart's content about the dy-
namics of reorganization, the fact is that it just does not occur in
most businesses. Chapter 11 is more an intensive-care ward (or a
mortuary) than a healing potion for sick businesses.
Let's try to demonstrate this conclusion on the basis of my ex-
perience, listing some of the express goals of the business 'reorgani-
zation law that Congress passed, undoubtedly with good intentions
and high hopes, and then comparing those to actual cases. First, by
enabling a business to continue its operations, Chapter 11 sought to
preserve its going-concern value, assuming that if the business were
broken up and liquidated in pieces, that value would be lost.3 Sec-
ond, Chapter 11 sought to protect the employment of workers. 4
Now, there are very well-known bankruptcy theorists who say this
policy plays no part in reorganization law, and I think some of their
arguments are well taken. But the fact is that concern for the wel-
fare of workers provided a significant motivation for the passage of
that law. Third, Chapter 11 posits a kind of debtor-creditor democ-
racy in which the creditors will negotiate and reach a consensual
arrangement with the debtor to reorganize the debts. All parties, it
is assumed, will be participating equally.5 Fourth, the reorganiza-
tion law tried to give owners-current owners who are running com-
panies, in some cases small mom and pop-type businesses-a
chance to get a plan confirmed, and thus achieve through Chapter
11 what they would achieve by obtaining a discharge in personal
bankruptcy.
2 Davis, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11 Completed by A.O. 's Bankruptcy Division, AM.
BANKR. INST. NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 18 (summarizing a study by Ed Glynn, Bank-
ruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
3 See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY 1100.01 (2d ed. 1987).
4 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).
5 See, e.g., id. §§ 1102, 1103 (1988).
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Are any of these goals fulfilled? In my experience, that is very
questionable. I would like to distinguish for analytical purposes be-
tween the vast majority of Chapter 11 proceedings, which you do
not read about in The Wall Street Journal, and the big ones-Texaco,
Continental and Eastern Airlines, Drexel-Burnham-which you do
read about. They are two entirely different species of cases. Let's
evaluate the type of case I worked on in terms of the Chapter 11
goals I just explained.
I suggested that the small Chapter 11 case concerns the para-
digmatic debtor, whose owner is the sort of person you want to have
running the company until his business improves or the economy
turns. Is that sort of case common? I would say no. Of the cases in
which I participated, a large number involved one-asset real estate
joint venture speculations. In such cases, investors had formed a
limited partnership to build a hotel or to develop raw land or to buy
an oil drilling rig, and had persuaded a financial institution to lend
them a lot of money. Other debtors are simply crooks. A lot of
crooks take advantage of Chapter 11. Some will file one case listing
two or three pieces of property; after allowing the creditor to fore-
close, the court will discover that the property seems to belong to
another entity 1000 miles away, that filed Chapter 11 just as the first
foreclosure was about to take place. These constitute not an insig-
nificant number of the total cases filed. Are these debtors people
that society would demand we protect? It seems unlikely. Most of
these people made bargains fully aware of the consequences: if you
are going into a real estate speculation, for instance, you know that
you may lose your money, and that you may have to pay up on your
guarantee. Similarly, society should give these crooks no advan-
tages. There are bankruptcy criminal laws, but they are hardly en-
forced nowadays, because it is far more attractive to a U.S. Attorney
to prosecute the thrifts and the drug dealers. In the end, the small
businessmen-the "worthy" debtors-account for a very small por-
tion of actual filings. And in light of the (possibly overstated) Chap-
ter 11 success rate of 10%, there is obviously a question as to the
costs and benefits of reorganization law.
Let's talk about the workers. I think the rationale for protecting
them arose many decades ago, when the labor market was not as
flexible as it is today. It is indeed sad to see people lose their jobs.
A lot of my friends lost their jobs in the banking and oil industry
down-turn in the 1980s. They did not have a Chapter 11 proceed-
ing to protect them. They lost their jobs because, for whatever rea-
son, their company or their industry could not go into Chapter 11.
But to say that Chapter 11 provides worker relief is largely a mirage.
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Most reorganized businesses ultimately fail. Protecting workers is
an admirable goal, but it is certainly not a controlling one.
Consider next the goal of achieving debtor-creditor democracy.
Chapter 11 aspires to create benefits for creditors and debtors alike
by allowing them to sit around the table, negotiate with each other,
and formulate a plan of reorganization based on their relative pri-
orities in the company. But it is crucial to remember that there are
different kinds of creditors. Sure, credit card creditors and bank
creditors make loans knowing that a certain number are not going
to pay off. There are, however, an awful lot of creditors that are
themselves no bigger than the hypothetical mom and pop debtor.
Every real estate speculator bought his land from somebody in West
Houston, quite often a farmer. Every hotel is supplied by the food
services and the laundry services, and these usually are not big orga-
nizations. They are not able to spread their risks or bear the ex-
penses of the delay that occurs in Chapter 11.
Would the small creditors be better off liquidating the company
and sharing quickly what small pittance remains rather than waiting
three or four years? Unequivocally yes. Why? Because the over-
head costs of Chapter 11 are extremely high. In Houston, a com-
pany seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief will have to put up about
$40,000 as a retainer to its lawyers. The creditor's lawyer will have
to appear in court about once or twice a month, waiting with his
clock running until the judge reaches the particular matter on the
docket. The expenses of collecting a debt in Chapter 11 can easily
run into the tens of thousands of dollars. Small creditors cannot
afford it. So what do they do? They do not participate. The idea of
creditor participation becomes a fantasy. Chapter 11 provides for
creditor committees, but in most Chapter 1 is there are no function-
ing creditor committees. The debtor is allowed to run the business,
and he usually runs it for his own benefit because he does not think
he has too much time left. Either small creditors are effectively dis-
enfranchised from the Chapter 11 process, or they find that their
costs radically exceed any potential recovery.
As I suggested earlier, we can distinguish small cases from the
big cases, where there is arguably some benefit to the creditors in
continuing operations. Perhaps Eastern Airlines, if it had been able
to work out its labor problems, would have yielded a larger return to
creditors by staying alive. Perhaps the same is true for Continental
Airlines. It remains rather questionable, however, because so many
of even the big cases file a second time in Chapter 11.6
6 'Chapter 22' Cases Point to Flaws in Bankruptcy System, HOUSTON POST, July 2, 1991,
at C-10.
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The point of this discussion is that the law allows a company to
stay in business without paying its debts, and simply does not fulfill
the express goals of its enactment. The only way we can solve this
problem is to change the bankruptcy law. And I would point out
that in the past 200 years, there have been about five or six different
bankruptcy laws. They tend to ebb and flow between showing ex-
cessive care for creditors and excessive care for debtors. It is not
unusual to propose changes to the Code.
What would I propose to change? I think one possibility is to
require some kind of petition seeking permission to reorganize
one's debts. I would exclude most one-asset real estate ventures
from the Chapter 11 process. Those ventures fail because the mar-
ket has not met their expectations. Their investors incurred a mort-
gage debt and are trying to get out from under it. It seems to me
that the real estate companies and the lending institutions would be
better off if we just let creditors foreclose and let the market evalu-
ate those assets anew.
As for the big companies, I think it might be helpful-realizing
that there were a lot of difficulties with a former law that called for
this measure7-simply to oust management and install an operating
trustee as soon as the companies file under Chapter 11. Most of
these companies do not end up with the management with whom
they started, and they certainly do not end up with the original
shareholders. Perhaps the imposition of an objective trustee in
cases where the company's assets exceed a certain level would allow
the preservation of those assets, eliminating the emotion and the
incentive to delay that typify the present system.
I leave you with the thought that Chapter 11 is a kind of death
penalty for debtors and for creditor interests. I told The Federalist
Society the last time I spoke here that the criminal death penalty
procedures were not working well, and I am telling you now that the
death penalty procedures for bankruptcy are not working well
either. Sometime I will come and have something optimistic to say.
7 See generally supra note 2 (describing Chapter X of the Chandler Act, Act ofJune
22, 1938, L. 575, 52 Stat. 840).
